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Chandler v. Miller: The Supreme Court
Closed the Door on the Factual Instances
That Warrant Suspicionless Searches

Chandler v. Miller1 involved the constitutionality of a Georgia statute
that required candidates for designated state offices to pass a drug test
prior to qualifying for nomination or election.'
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In 1990 the Georgia General Assembly enacted a law requiring
candidates for designated state offices to certify that they had tested
negative for illegal drugs thirty days prior to qualifying for nomination
or election? To ensure the testing scheme's professional validity, the
statute required the procedure to comport with the Mandatory Guidelines for Federal Workplace Drug Testing Programs.4 Candidates who
sought qualification for nomination or election to a designated state
office were informed that the procedure could be conducted at any stateapproved medical testing laboratory or in the privacy of the candidate's
personal physician's office? Once a sample was obtained, it was sent
to an approved laboratory to determine whether any of the specified
illegal drugs were present. A certificate reporting the results of the test
was then sent to the candidate. The certificate did not include a detailed
analysis of the candidate's sample but merely provided that a drug
screen had been performed and that the results were negative.
I.

1. 117 S. Ct. 1295 (1997).
2. Id. at 1298. See O.C.G.A. § 21-2-140 (1993).

3. 117 S. Ct. at 1299. The statute listed as "illegal drugs": marijuana, cocaine, opiates,
amphetamines, and phencyclidines. The designated state offices were: the Governor,
Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, Attorney General, State School Superintendent,
Commissioner of Insurance, Commissioner of Agriculture, Commissioner of Labor, Justices
of the Georgia Supreme Court, Judges of the Georgia Court of Appeals, judges of the
superior courts, district attorneys, members of the General Assembly, and members of the

Public Service Commission. See id.
4. Respondents' Brief at 1, Chandler (No. 96-126).
5. 117 S.Ct. at 1299.
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In May 1994 petitioners Chandler, Harris, and Walker, Libertarian
Party nominees, filed this action seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia. Petitioners filed suit against Governor Zell Miller and two
other state officials involved in administering the statute.6 The district
court, relying on the important nature of the offices sought coupled with
the relative unintrusiveness of the testing procedure, denied petitioners'
motion for preliminary injunctive relief.' In January 1995 the district
court entered judgment for respondents. 8
On appeal a divided Eleventh Circuit panel affirmed the decision."
The court concluded that the state's important interest in maintaining
the integrity of its high public offices outweighed the individual privacy
expectations intruded upon by the mandatory drug testing requirement."0 Consequently, the court held the statute, as applied in this
instance, to be consistent with the requirements of the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments."
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.12 The Court
concluded that Georgia's drug testing scheme for candidates seeking to
qualify for nomination or election did not fall within the narrow scope
of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches. 3
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

It is undisputed that government-ordered collection and testing of
bodily fluids constitutes a search governed by the strictures of the
Fourth Amendment.' 4 The Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution provides: "The right of the people to be secure in, their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause . ... ." Traditionally, the Supreme Court has deemed

6. Id The Libertarian Party nominated Walker L. Chandler for the office of
Lieutenant Governor, Sharon T. Harris for the office of Commissioner of Agriculture, and

James D. Walker for the office of member of the General Assembly. See id.
7. Id. Petitioners then submitted to the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 21-2-140 and
appeared on the ballot. After the election, petitioners moved for final judgment on
stipulated facts. See id.

8. Id.
9. Chandler v. Miller, 73 F.3d 1543, 1544 (11th Cir. 1996).
10. Id. at 1547.
11. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. amend. IV and XIV).

12. 117 S. Ct. at 1298.
13. Id.
14. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616-18 (1989).
15. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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a warrantless search reasonable only when accompanied by some degree
of individualized suspicion. 6 However, the Court has recently recognized certain situations when a search was considered reasonable in the
absence of any level of individualized suspicion.17
In New Jersey v. TL.O.,' 8 the Court defined the limited circumstances to which this exception applies: "Only in those exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement
impracticable, is a court entitled to substitute its balancing of interests
for that of the Framers." 9 In these limited circumstances, the Court
used a two-tiered analysis to determine the reasonableness of the search.
At the first tier, the Court focused upon whether or not a "special need"
existed. Once a "special need" was established, the Court attempted at
the second tier to balance the government's interests against the
individual's privacy expectations to determine whether it was practical
to require a warrant or some level of individualized suspicion in the
particular context.20
The "special needs" balancing test was first applied in the context of
a mandatory drug testing scheme in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n.2 In Skinner the Court upheld Federal Railroad Administration ("FRA") regulations that required mandatory drug testing of
employees who were involved in certain train accidents or had violated
certain safety rules.22 The regulations were enacted in response to
evidence of drug abuse by railway employees and the obvious safety
hazards posed by this abuse.2 3
The Court found that the government's interest in testing without a
showing of individualized suspicion in this context was indeed compelling and sufficient to constitute a "special need."2 4 Railroad employees
subject to the testing regulations were responsible for duties "fraught
with such risks of injury to others that even a momentary lapse of
Because these
attention [could] have disastrous consequences."'
employees could cause significant human loss before any signs of
impairment became apparent to others, the requirement of individual-

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

489 U.s. at 624.
Id.
469 U.S. 325 (1985).
Id. at 351.
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619.

21. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).

22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. at 606, 613.
Id. at 608.
Id. at 628.
Id
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ized suspicion would frustrate the purpose for which the governmental
scheme was enacted.2"
The Court's analysis then shifted to the individual privacy expectations intruded upon by the testing scheme. While the Court noted that
government-ordered collection of blood and urine samples necessarily
infringed upon the privacy expectations of the employee, the Court
concluded that these expectations were diminished by the employees'
participation in an industry that was highly regulated to ensure
safety.27 Therefore, the Court held that the testing procedures contemplated by the regulations posed a justifiable threat to the expectations
of privacy of the covered employees.' Having recognized the existence
of a "special need," the Court held that the government's compelling
interests served by the FRAs regulations outweighed the individual
privacy concerns of the railroad employees."
In National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,' decided the
same day as Skinner, the Supreme Court had another opportunity to
apply its newly forged "special needs" balancing test. In Von Raab the
Court sustained a United States Customs Service program that
conditioned promotions or transfers to certain positions upon the
successful completion of a drug test.3 The positions covered by the
testing scheme were those that: (1) directly involved drug interdiction,
(2) required the incumbent to carry a firearm, and (3) required the
incumbent to handle classified materials. 2
To determine whether a "special need" existed, the Court looked again
to the nature of the government's interest. The Court concluded that the
government had a compelling interest in ensuring that those directly
involved in drug interdiction were physically fit and had unimpeachable
judgment and integrity.33 Additionally, the public interest demanded
that those employees in a position to use deadly force should not suffer
from the impaired perception and judgment that stems from illegal drug
use." The Court reasoned that because "it [was] not feasible to subject
[these] employees and their work product to [that] kind of day-to-day
scrutiny," the requirement of individualized suspicion would severely

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id.
Id. at 627.
Id. at 628.
Id. at 633.
489 U.S. 656 (1989).

31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 679.
Id. at 660-61.
Id. at 670.
Id. at 671.
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frustrate the purpose for which the program was enacted. 6 Therefore,
a "special need" existed, and the balancing test was appropriate.
The Court then turned to the privacy expectations of the individual
employees. While courts have noted that "[tihere are few activities in
our society more personal or private than the passing of urine," certain
areas of public employment demand a diminished expectation of personal
privacy.6 Although this type of intrusion may be considered unreasonable in other contexts, the "'operational realities of the workplace'"
rendered this type of work-related intrusion entirely reasonable. 7
Because the government's compelling interests outweighed the privacy
expectations of the employees, the Court held the government's testing
program to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment."
The Court most recently applied the "special needs" balancing test in
the context of a mandatory drug testing scheme in Vernonia School
District47J v. Acton. 9 In Vernonia the Court upheld a random drug
testing program for high school athletes.4' The program was sparked
by a marked increase in drug use among the children in the district
schools.4
In determining whether the government's interest was sufficient to
constitute a "special need," the Court sought guidance from its previous
holdings in this area.4' The Court concluded that the deterrence of
drug use by our nation's school children was at least as compelling as
the nation's war on drugs, or the deterrence of drug use by those
engaged in the railroad industry.4 The Court next focused its analysis
on the privacy expectations intruded upon by the testing program,
concluding that school children, who have been committed temporarily
to the custody of the State, have minimal expectations of privacy."
The Court noted that because public school children were consistently
required to submit to various physical examinations, the privacy
interests compromised by this testing procedure were negligible.45
Having recognized the existence of a "special need," the Court held that
the drug testing scheme, when weighed against the school children's

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 674.
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 175 (5th Cir. 1987).
Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 671 (quoting O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 717 (1987)).
Id. at 677.
515 U.S. 646 (1995).
Id. at 664-65.
Id. at 648-50.
Id. at 653-54.
Id. at 661.
Id at 656-57.
Id.
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minimal privacy expectations, was reasonable within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.46
While the Supreme Court's "special needs" balancing test has become
the yardstick by which reasonableness is measured in the context of
suspicionless searches, it has not been universally accepted by the
Justices of the Supreme Court. In a strongly worded dissent, Justice
Marshall criticized the majority in Skinner for allowing the recognition
of a "special need" to displace the constitutional prescriptions of the
Fourth Amendment.47 Marshall noted that while the majority purports
to limit its holding to the testing of employees with "safety sensitive"
jobs, "the damage done to the Fourth Amendment is not so easily
cabined. The majority's acceptance of dragnet blood and urine testing
ensures that the first, and worst, casualty of the war on drugs will be
the precious liberties of our citizens."'
In Von Raab Justice Scalia
criticized the majority's application of the "special needs" balancing test
as an "immolation of privacy and human dignity in symbolic opposition
to drug use.'

As predicted- by Justice Marshall, the damage occasioned upon the
Fourth Amendment by the "special needs" analysis has not been
sufficiently cabined. In fact, the factual instances that give rise to a
"special need" have continued to expand. Prior to the Court decision in
Chandler, the Supreme Court had never invalidated a mandatory drug
testing scheme under the "special needs" analysis.
III.

CouRT's RATIONALE

In assessing the validity of Georgia's drug testing scheme, the Court
first sought to determine whether the "special needs" balancing test was
appropriate in this context.5" Referring to the test articulated in
TL. 0., the Court reiterated the notion that before the Court could
substitute its balancing for that of the Framers, a "special need" must
exist beyond the needs of law enforcement that renders the requirement
of individualized suspicion impracticable.51 The Court then attempted
to determine whether Georgia's proffered interests in performing a
suspicionless search constituted a "special need."52

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 664-65.
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 635-36 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 636.
Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 681 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Chandler, 117 S. Ct. at 1297.
Id. at 1303.
Id.
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Respondents rested their justification of a "special need" primarily
upon the fundamental incompatibility of holding state office and the use
of illegal drugs.58 Georgia maintained that its interest in preventing
its public offices from being occupied by illegal drug users was indeed
"compelling" and sufficient to constitute a "special need."5 4 Respondents attempted to liken their scheme to the one upheld in Von Raab."'
Georgia asserted that state officials, like customs officials, were often the
targets of bribery and other acts of impropriety." The Court, however,
came to quite a different conclusion.
The Court stated that noticeably lacking from respondents' scheme
was any "concrete danger" demanding a departure from the requirement
of individualized suspicion.57 The Court then looked to the record to
see if the hazards described by respondents were supported by any
factual evidence. While a demonstrated problem of drug abuse was not
a prerequisite to the validity of a testing program, it "would shore up an
assertion of [a] special need for a suspicionless general search proBecause Georgia's testing program was not enacted in
gram."
response to any demonstrated problem of drug abuse, the Court
concluded that it did not constitute a "special need" as contemplated by
Vernonia or Skinner.5 9
The Court then focused its analysis on the nature of the "special need"
created by the testing scheme in Von Raab.' The Court noted that
while the testing program of Von Raab was not predicated upon a
demonstrated problem of drug abuse, a "special need" existed in part
because of the public safety issues involved. 1 Additionally, because
Customs officials were not subject to daily scrutiny, the requirement of
individualized suspicion would not function in this environment.62 The
Court concluded that candidates, on the other hand, were subject to
"relentless scrutiny-by their peers, the public, and the press. " "
Because of this scrutiny, the Court determined that a departure from the
requirement of individualized suspicion would be inappropriate."

53. Id.
54. Id.
55, Id. at 1304.

56. Id
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 1303.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1304.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1305.
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Ultimately, the Court held that because Georgia's testing scheme did
not implicate notions of public safety and was not predicated upon a
demonstrated problem of drug abuse, a "special need" did not exist."
Because respondents' scheme was not necessitated by a "special need,"
the balancing test was inapplicable to this case."
Chief Justice Rehnquist, the lone dissenter, condemned the selective
application of the Court's precedent in this area. The Chief Justice
stated that a "special need" existed when there was a compelling
governmental purpose other than law enforcement."7 He likened
respondents scheme to the one upheld in Von Raab.' In Von Raab the
Court would have upheld the suspicionless searches of employees who
were not directly involved with public safety but instead handled
classified materials. The Court "readily agree[d] that the Government
has a compelling interest in protecting truly sensitive information from
those who, 'under compulsion of circumstances or for other reasons,...
might compromise [such] information."'8 9 The Chief Justice argued
that this compelling interest created a "special need" that should
properly invoke the balancing test.7" Justice Rehnquist asserted that
when Georgia's testing program was viewed through "the correct lens of
our precedents in this area, the Georgia urinalysis test [was] a
'reasonable' search; it is only by distorting these precedents that the
Court [was] able to reach the result [that] it [did]." 7 '
IV. IMPLICATIONS
The decision in Chandler v. Miller represents a marked shift in the
Court's philosophy with respect to its decisions regarding suspicionless
searches. The holding in Chandler was a clear departure from an
increasing trend in support of the government's authority to conduct
suspicionless searches. In Chandlerthe Court once again breathed life
into the Fourth Amendment, taking a small step toward reading the
probable cause requirement back into the Constitution.
Chandlermarks the first time in the Court's history that a mandatory
drug testing scheme has been ruled unconstitutional. In the wake of
Skinner, Von Raab, and Vernonia, many scholars feared that the "special
needs" exception would be extended beyond the narrow circumstances

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1306 (Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting).
Id.
Id at 1307 (brackets in original).
Id.
Id.
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justifying them and in a sense leaving the door to blanket suspicionless
searches wide open."2 However, the Supreme Court in Chandler put
these fears to rest as it began to close the door on the factual instances
that would warrant a suspicionless search. Addressing the concerns
expressed by Justice Scalia's dissent in Von Raab, the decision in
Chandler distinguished between the acceptable suspicionless searches
involving public safety and factually supported instances of drug abuse
from the unacceptable blanket suspicionless searches used to drive home
the message that illegal drug use will simply not be tolerated.
Perhaps the holding in Chandler will doom future deployments of the
government's "Draconian weapon-the compulsory collection and
chemical testing of ...

blood and urine""3 on large groups of white-

collar employees in an attempt to revitalize this nation's war on drugs.
JUSTIN SCOTT

72. Fourth Amendment-Mandatory Drug Testing-Eleventh Circuit Upholds
SuspicionlessDrugTesting for PoliticalCandidates,Chandler v. Miller, 73 F.3d 1543 (11th
Cir. 1996), 110 HARV L. REV. 547, 547 (1996).
73. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1423.

